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GENDER, ABORTION, AND TRAVEL AFTER ROE’S END 
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay responds to Professor Richard Fallon’s If Roe Were Overruled: 
Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World.1  Professor Fallon’s 
Article exposes as fallacies four popular beliefs about the legal landscape after 
the end of Roe v. Wade,2 including the belief that states restricting abortion will 
and can reach conduct only within their boundaries.  As he persuasively 
explains in debunking this “third fallacy,”3 criminal authority probably extends 
beyond state lines, and the outer limits of a state’s criminal legislative 
jurisdiction pose a host of contested issues, including the tension between 
national and state citizenship.4 
Although endorsing Professor Fallon’s rejection of our intuitively 
territorial understanding of criminal law, this Essay proceeds a step further, 
however—examining a fallacy that lies within his third fallacy and the 
consequences of this new fallacy.  Briefly put, while Professor Fallon’s 
analysis of the third fallacy assumes that states banning abortions seek to 
protect a particular class of fetuses, this Essay challenges that assumption.  
This Essay emphasizes instead such states’ purpose of controlling women and 
explores what this policy of policing gender behavior means for the out-of-
state abortions hypothesized by Professor Fallon.  This closer look at an 
abortion-banning state’s purposes and policies complements Professor Fallon’s 
 
* Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law 
in St. Louis.  Thanks to Professors Samuel W. Buell, Herma Hill Kay, Laura A. Rosenbury, 
Margo Schlanger, and Reva B. Siegel for helpful comments on earlier drafts, to the other 
participants in the Childress Lecture events at Saint Louis University School of Law for the 
stimulating conversation, to the members of the Board of Directors of Planned Parenthood of the 
St. Louis Region and Washington University’s Law Students for Choice for the engaging 
discussions, and to my students in Conflict of Laws (Fall 2006) for their thoughtful responses 
over the numerous occasions that I raised these issues in class. 
 1. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-
Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611 (2007). 
 2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 3. Fallon, supra note 1, at 625–48. 
 4. See id. at 640–48. 
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use of modern choice-of-law theory, which relies on such underlying purposes 
and policies to decide multistate cases. 
After exploring and modifying the law hypothesized in Professor Fallon’s 
third fallacy, this Essay analyzes the choice-of-law and constitutional questions 
posed by extraterritorial criminal abortion bans.  It then considers recent 
developments that suggest less controversial but equally effective alternatives 
for deterring out-of-state abortion activity: civil remedies, principally tort 
liability, but also injunctive relief.  This Essay concludes by challenging 
Professor Fallon’s self-proclaimed non-normative position.5  Instead, I express 
my opposition to overruling Roe, situating this opposition in a long line of 
important choice-of-law cases about legal rules that subordinated women and 
constrained their agency. 
I.  EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL ABORTION LAWS 
A common view of the United States after Roe’s end envisions a 
patchwork of state laws, with some permitting abortion and others banning it.  
This view not only reflects the state of affairs before the Supreme Court 
decided Roe in 1973, but also accords with an understanding of abortion as a 
matter of family law, traditionally a state prerogative.6  And it provides one 
illustration of the oft-cited slogan of federalism that looks to experimentation 
conducted within “the ‘laboratory’ of the States”7 for successful resolution of 
contentious issues of social policy. 
Yet, just as before Roe,8 women with sufficient resources and 
determination might well travel from their homes in restrictive states to more 
permissive jurisdictions to terminate their pregnancies.  Hence, a state truly 
committed to preventing abortions would legislate to plug this travel 
“loophole.” 
A. Exploring the Geography of Conception 
Against this background, Professor Fallon hypothesizes “a state criminal 
statute making it unlawful for citizens to procure out-of-state as well as in-state 
 
 5. Id. at 633. 
 6. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and 
Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1821 (1995). 
 7. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)); see also, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 326 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting); Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States’ Interest in the Marital Status of Their 
Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2000). 
 8. In perhaps the most publicized pre-Roe case of migratory abortion, Sherri Finkbine went 
to Sweden to terminate a pregnancy after the teratogenic effects of Thalidomide became known.  
See Sherri Finkbine, The Lesser of Two Evils, in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION NOW 15 
(Alan F. Guttmacher ed., 1967). 
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abortions of fetuses conceived within the regulating state.”9  In fact, over and 
over he writes about citizens pregnant with fetuses conceived locally,10 albeit 
with the following qualification: 
  In framing these questions, I am less interested in attempting to squeeze 
the competing interests into a contacts-based framework than in identifying 
what the Supreme Court in a practical sense would need to decide.  In 
substance and effect, the Court would need to weigh one state’s interests in 
protecting fetal life against another state’s interests in making abortion within 
its territory a matter of individual conscience, and it would need to do so while, 
at the same time, taking account of the implications of national citizenship.11 
Professor Fallon’s Article does not explain his emphasis on the location of 
conception.12  Yet his focus on fetuses conceived locally by women citizens of 
restrictive states poses many problems—practical, doctrinal, and theoretical—
that merit exploration.  After analyzing these questions, I conclude that 
Professor Fallon’s emphasis on the place of conception is not only 
unnecessarily difficult and obfuscatory, but it is also altogether unnecessary. 
The practical problems stem from both prosecutorial obligations and the 
incentives created by Professor Fallon’s law.  First, if in-state conception 
constitutes an element of the crime defined by the restrictive state, the 
prosecution must prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt.13  How would 
the evidence be collected, except in the case in which the male participating in 
conception became a witness for the state—perhaps creating a whole new 
category of “he said/she said” controversies?  Indeed, if any shred of the right 
to privacy first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut14 and recently 
reinvigorated by Lawrence v. Texas15 survives the hypothesized overruling of 
Roe,16 then investigations of the place of conception would prove highly 
problematic. 
 
 9. Fallon, supra note 1, at 627. 
 10. Id. at 627, 630, 633, 634, 639. 
 11. Id. at 634. 
 12. In informal conversation, he indicated that the location of conception might prove 
determinative in assessing the constitutionality of a restrictive state’s application of its own law to 
an out-of-state abortion.  Conversation with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor 
of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School, in St. Louis, Mo. (Oct. 13, 2006); see infra notes 
99–105 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005) (quoting In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). 
 14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see id. at 485 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”). 
 15. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see id. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve public 
conduct or prostitution. . . .  The State cannot demean [petitioners’] existence or control their 
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”). 
 16. Professor Fallon considers this issue in his analysis of the “fourth fallacy,” the erroneous 
view that “a Supreme Court decision overruling Roe v. Wade would, or at least could, be so 
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Further, if the restrictive state’s ban covered only local conceptions, then—
in its effort to discourage evasive, out-of-state abortions—this ban might 
encourage evasive, out-of-state sexual relations, undertaken elsewhere by local 
citizens as an extra precaution against an unwanted pregnancy within this 
state’s control.  In other words, if a truly risk-averse citizen of a restrictive 
state were to do all she could to avoid undesired consequences, then she would 
not only use birth control, which might fail, but she would also willingly 
engage in sexual relations only outside this state.  Hence, the restrictive state’s 
message, under Professor Fallon’s hypothetical statute, would become: “If you 
really don’t want a pregnancy that you must continue, then don’t have sex 
here.”  This message would give an entirely new meaning to the term “fertility 
tourism,” which now refers to travel undertaken for access to assisted 
reproductive technologies!17  More significantly, this “no-sex-here” message 
would raise right-to-privacy problems under precedents like Griswold and 
Lawrence.18 
Finally, the foregoing analysis assumes that the place of sexual intercourse 
and the place of conception always coincide.  Apart from present-day 
disagreements about whether “conception” refers to fertilization or subsequent 
implantation,19 even Roe itself acknowledged “embryological data that purport 
 
written that the rest of constitutional jurisprudence involving fundamental rights would survive 
unaltered.”  Fallon, supra note 1, at 648. 
 17. See Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and 
Feminist Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295 (2005); see also Debora Spar, Reproductive Tourism and 
the Regulatory Map, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 531, 531 (2005); Felicia R. Lee, Driven by Costs, 
Fertility Clients Head Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at A1; cf. Hodas v. Morin, 814 
N.E.2d 320, 322 (Mass. 2004); Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the 
Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 399, 444–52 (1990). 
  This scenario also conjures up references to old prosecutions under the Mann Act, which 
now prohibits transporting an individual in interstate commerce “with intent that such individual 
engage . . . in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000); see, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 486 
(1917) (construing predecessor statute’s terms, which prohibited transportation of females across 
state lines “for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for ‘any other immoral purpose’”). 
 18. Some commentators read Lawrence to protect a right to sexual pleasure, as against the 
state.  See Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 1555, 1582 (2004) (Lawrence “resembles nothing so much as the Playboy Philosophy 
articulated by Hugh Hefner during the 1960s in a long, ambitious series of essays in Playboy 
magazine.”).  But see Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding 
ban on sale of sex toys), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. King, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); State v. 
Acosta, No. 08-04-00312-CR, 2005 WL 2095290 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2005) (same), cert. 
denied sub nom. Acosta v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 129 (2006). 
 19. The disagreement has surfaced in the context of emergency contraception.  For example, 
an op-ed piece by Mitt Romney, then-Governor of Massachusetts, explaining his veto of a law 
facilitating access to emergency contraception, asserted that the drug would “terminate life after 
conception.”  Mitt Romney, Op-Ed., Why I Vetoed Contraception Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 
2005, at A17.  The contrasting view maintains that “[t]he science is very clear that [emergency 
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to indicate that conception is a ‘process’ over time, rather than an event . . . .”20  
As a result, participants and prosecutors alike would have difficulty 
pinpointing the location of conception, whether trying to escape a law that 
covers only abortions of fetuses conceived in a particular state or to prove this 
law’s violation. 
Of course, criminal statutes have an expressive function.  Whether or not 
the need to prove in-state conception would make the hypothetical ban 
unworkable as a practical matter, once on the books a law communicates a 
state policy and influences behavior.  Yet, if this line of thinking helps avoid 
the practical problems, it also reveals other problems. 
One such additional problem is doctrinal.  If the state uses the location of 
conception as a way to distinguish “its” fetuses from fetuses that belong to 
another state, it has chosen an unusual reference point.  Even if a restrictive 
state equates a fetus with an infant—so that conception for a fetus would play 
the role that birth now plays for an infant—states ordinarily attach little 
doctrinal relevance to this variable.  Although birth in the United States does 
make one a citizen of this country,21 nonetheless, for example, an application 
of a state’s child abuse laws does not depend on the place of the child’s birth.  
Indeed, as I develop later, to the extent that a state might seek to protect “its” 
fetuses from abortion, it probably would focus on domicile as the relevant 
geographic connection.22  Under traditional doctrine, an infant takes the 
domicile of the parent by operation of law even if the infant is born elsewhere 
and has never lived in the state.23 
Moreover, the doctrinal importance of the parent’s domicile helps expose a 
theoretical problem in Professor Fallon’s hypothetical—a new fallacy within 
the fallacy that he analyzes.  By suggesting that a restrictive state would limit 
its extraterritorial prohibitions to situations in which its female citizens were 
pregnant with fetuses conceived locally and by imagining a judicial need to 
balance “one state’s interests in protecting fetal life against another state’s 
interests in making abortion within its territory a matter of individual 
conscience,”24 Professor Fallon implies that abortion bans simply aim to 
protect fetuses—and a narrow class of them at that.  I disagree, theorizing that 
the underlying policies first and foremost concern women and contending that 
Professor Fallon’s approach obscures this point. 
 
contraception] does not cause an abortion.”  Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 48 (quoting William Smith of the Sexuality Information and 
Education Council of the United States). 
 20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973). 
 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2000). 
 22. See infra notes 93–106 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48–49 (1989). 
 24. Fallon, supra note 1, at 634 (quoted supra in text accompanying note 11). 
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B. Abortion Laws Will Keep Their Gender After Roe 
In contrast to Professor Fallon’s suggestion, I would assert that abortion 
bans principally aim to control women and to regulate gender behavior.  One 
can find many clues—from scholarship, case law, legislation, and empirical 
studies—to support this thesis.  These clues and the policies they reveal, in 
turn, materially affect the choice-of-law inquiry evoked by hypothetical 
extraterritorial abortion prohibitions.  This section examines these clues, 
setting the stage for a modern choice-of-law analysis. 
To begin, a number of persuasive scholarly accounts unmask abortion 
restrictions as official efforts to impose traditional gender norms, regardless of 
any apparent emphasis on the fetus.  For example, in her historical analysis and 
critique of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, Professor Reva Siegel 
resists efforts to confine our understanding of human reproduction to a 
physiological process.25  She demonstrates that, instead, “it is a social process, 
occurring in and governed by culture”26 and “[i]n each culture, norms and 
practices of the community, including those of family, market, medicine, 
church, and state, combine to shape the social relations of reproduction.”27  
Examined in context, abortion restrictions reflect a norm of compulsory 
motherhood and, according to Siegel, “from a social standpoint . . . [a] 
legislature’s purpose in enacting restrictions on abortion is to pressure or 
compel women to carry a pregnancy to term which they would otherwise 
terminate . . . .”28  Further, she explains, with a focus on the fetus as a rationale 
for abortion restrictions, “state action compelling women to perform the work 
of motherhood can be justified without ever acknowledging that the state is 
enforcing a gender status role.”29  Many others share this basic perspective, 
including Professors Sylvia Law,30 Frances Olsen,31 and Donald Regan,32 to 
name just a few. 
The Court’s recent opinions reinforce this scholarly understanding of 
abortion restrictions as gender regulation.  When a majority of the Court in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey33 upheld a 
mandatory waiting period and state script to “inform” individual abortion 
 
 25. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). 
 26. Id. at 267. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 357–58. 
 29. Id. at 277. 
 30. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1016–21 
(1984). 
 31. Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 126–33 (1989). 
 32. Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979) (analyzing 
how abortion restrictions single out pregnant women to be Good Samaritans). 
 33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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choices, the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter validated 
a portrait of women as incompetent decisionmakers, dependent on the state to 
orchestrate their deliberation and provide relevant information.34  The 
dissenting Justices took this image of incompetence and dependence a step 
further in explaining why they would have also upheld a spousal notification 
requirement that the majority struck down.35  Quoting the now much more 
significant words of then-Judge Alito of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, the dissenters wrote: “the Pennsylvania legislature could have 
rationally believed that some married women are initially inclined to obtain an 
abortion without their husbands’ knowledge because of perceived problems—
such as economic constraints, future plans, or the husbands’ previously 
expressed opposition—that may be obviated by discussion prior to the 
abortion.”36  As Professor Samuel Bagenstos has observed, the Justices have 
already started down a doctrinal path of justifying abortion restrictions “in the 
name of choice,” and this path could lead them to conclude that “autonomy 
may be best served by prohibiting abortion entirely—particularly if the 
pressures that operate on a woman’s choice are subtle and hard to detect in any 
particular instance.”37  I would simply emphasize the gendered nature of this 
particular concept of autonomy and the underlying state purposes that it 
reflects. 
More recent cases on the validity of so-called “partial-birth abortion bans” 
also provide telling evidence of the gender regulation at work in contemporary 
abortion regulations.  These cases reveal official efforts to subordinate women 
and their health, not for the sake of saving fetuses, but rather for the sake of 
expressing a symbolic or ideological position. 
In Stenberg v. Carhart,38 in which a majority struck down a Nebraska 
statute, several of the opinions noted that the law, which contained no 
exception for the woman’s health, would not prevent a woman from 
 
 34. Id. at 880–87 (joint opinion); cf. Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O’Connor and the Substance 
of Equal Citizenship, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 425–26 (2003) (speculating why Justice O’Connor 
might have agreed to this result in order to secure votes to invalidate the spousal notification 
requirement, which “surely presented the women’s-rights aspect of the case in its strongest 
light”). 
 35. Casey, 505 U.S. at 974–76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 974–75 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 726 (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 37. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
425, 449 (2006).  Professor Siegel’s more recent work examines the rise of arguments that 
“abortion hurts women,” invoked to justify restrictions on abortion for the purpose of protecting 
women.  See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007) (discussed infra notes 55–64 
and accompanying text). 
 38. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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terminating a pregnancy so long as she used a different method or procedure.39  
Against this background, Nebraska’s stated legislative interests invite close 
analysis.  According to the state’s brief, quoted by the Court, the law “‘show[s] 
concern for the life of the unborn,’ ‘prevent[s] cruelty to partially born 
children,’ and ‘preserve[s] the integrity of the medical profession.’”40  In his 
Stenberg dissent, Justice Kennedy described the law as the reflection of the 
state’s finding of “a consequential moral difference” between abortion 
methods.41 
We can see, then, that the state would subordinate women’s health in the 
service of an ideological position.  Said differently, once saving a fetus is “off 
the table” and alternative abortion methods are taken into account, the 
remaining state interests are largely symbolic.  And the state would place the 
burden of advancing these ideological or symbolic interests solely on women, 
even at the cost of their health.  This calculus, trading off women’s health 
against a state’s symbolic expression, arguably reflects the norm of self-
sacrifice and service traditionally presumed of women.42  But, even if one does 
not accept this characterization, at the very least it is clear that the state’s goals 
do not include the protection of particular fetuses. 
The transcript of the oral arguments in the Supreme Court in the challenge 
to the federal ban on “partial birth abortion,” Gonzales v. Carhart,43 identifies 
a similar balance of interests. Again, official efforts to jettison protection for a 
 
 39. The majority concludes that the ban’s language covered not only dilation and extraction 
(D & X) abortions but also the more commonly performed dilation and evacuation (D & E) 
abortions and hence imposed an unconstitutional undue burden.  Id. at 938–46.  Yet the majority 
also observed, “The Nebraska law, of course, does not directly further an interest ‘in the 
potentiality of human life’ by saving the fetus in question from destruction, as it regulates only a 
method of performing abortion.”  Id. at 930.  Justice Ginsburg made a similar point.  Id. at 951 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).  And Justice Kennedy’s dissent asserted that “the law denies no 
woman the right to choose an abortion.”  Id. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 930–31 (quoting Brief for Petitioners 48). 
 41. Id. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 42. See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971) 
(interpreting anti-abortion laws as imposing Samaritan duties on women).  When Professor Regan 
relies on this analysis, however, he contrasts laws requiring sacrifice for the sake of a specific 
individual with laws requiring sacrifice for the sake of a public interest.  Regan, supra note 32, at 
1606.  One can also see this norm of maternal self-sacrifice in cases ordering caesarean sections 
over the pregnant woman’s objection.  See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990) 
(reversing order below requiring caesarean); see also, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization 
of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492 (1993) (noting how outsider pregnant women, in particular, are 
presumed selfish when they reject recommended treatment); cf. Susan M. Wolf, Physician-
Assisted Suicide, Abortion, and Treatment Refusal: Using Gender to Analyze the Difference, in 
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 167 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1997) (contrasting abortion with assisted 
suicide and worrying that females’ willingness to sacrifice their interests to relieve others of their 
care makes women a target of involuntary euthanasia disguised as assisted suicide). 
 43. 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006) (granting certiorari). 
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woman’s health (as shown by testimony in the courts below, albeit contrary to 
congressional findings) are defended in the name of an objective conceded to 
be something other than saving a fetal life.44  Hence, the opinions in Casey and 
the laws challenged in Stenberg and Gonzales v. Carhart cast doubt on the 
fetal focus that Professor Fallon assumes in his examination of post-Roe 
extraterritorial abortion bans. 
To be fair, however, one must consider the possibility that Roe and 
subsequent cases have distorted contemporary abortion regulation.  In other 
words, once Roe indicated that protecting fetal life becomes a “compelling 
state interest” only after viability,45 anti-abortion legislatures necessarily 
crafted their laws in the shadow of such Court-imposed limitations.  And when 
Casey pushed back from Roe’s strict approach, authorizing pre-viability 
promotion of “know[ledge] that there are philosophic and social arguments of 
great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy 
to full term,”46 legislatures likely incorporated these newly approved objectives 
into their enactments.  Perhaps without the constraints required by the Supreme 
Court, states banning abortion would indeed seek to protect individual fetuses 
and, hence, Professor Fallon’s post-Roe scenario properly accounts for this 
predictable change. 
Two rejoinders emerge from the structure of many abortion restrictions 
themselves, however.  First, many restrictions that would follow the demise of 
Roe would likely contain rape and incest exceptions, exceptions appearing in 
the various regulations that exist today.  For example, current federal law 
governing the military disallows abortions at Department of Defense facilities 
except when the pregnancy endangers the woman’s life or results from rape or 
incest.47  Laws providing federal funds to the states as part of certain public 
assistance programs generally disallow payments for abortion services except 
those for pregnancies threatening the woman’s life or resulting from rape or 
incest.48  As one proponent of abortion prohibitions recently explained his 
support for rape and incest exceptions on national television: “It’s a situation 
where the pregnancy was not voluntary, and I think the law ought to draw a 
different balance under those circumstances.”49  This approach to abortion 
 
 44. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–17, Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006) (No. 
05-380), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
05-380.pdf. 
 45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64, 173 (1973). 
 46. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(providing the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter). 
 47. 10 U.S.C. § 1093 (2000). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(7) (2000). 
 49. Meet the Press: Senate Debate; Missouri Incumbent Senator Jim Talent vs. Democrat 
Claire McCaskill (KSDK television broadcast Oct. 8, 2006). 
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regulation reveals that fetal protection is really not the overriding objective.50  
Rather, abortion prohibitions seek to compel that women’s (voluntary) sexual 
activities always have consequences—motherhood or at least the risk of 
motherhood.51 
Second, criminalization, both old and new, targets the conduct of the 
abortion provider but not the woman, treating her as a victim of the procedure 
that she has elected.  Historian Leslie Reagan has chronicled the law’s 
conflicting constructions of the abortion patient, contrasting legislative efforts 
to cast the woman as an accomplice with judicial impulses to portray her as a 
victim.52  Although we might suppose that post-Roe bans will have difficulty 
addressing this issue, given modern sex-equality jurisprudence,53 considerable 
evidence indicates that the understanding of woman-as-victim will persist.54 
A task force report provided to the South Dakota legislature pursues this 
notion to the hilt, expressly promoting a “woman-protective” rationale for 
outlawing abortion.55  The “talking points” in this rhetorical strategy include 
allegations about coercion from the “abortion industry,” emotional difficulties 
 
 50. I do not want to overstate the point.  Some modern abortion restrictions do not include 
exceptions for rape and incest.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30 (2006) (providing a 
prohibition designed to take effect upon reversal of Roe v. Wade).  But see S.B. 2391, § 2(2), 
2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2007) (providing a prohibition, signed by Gov. Haley Barbour on 
Mar. 22, 2007, designed to take effect upon reversal of Roe, but with a rape exception). 
 51. I have written elsewhere about the gender-based double standard concerning sexual 
pleasure reflected in modern popular culture and anti-abortion efforts.  See Susan Frelich 
Appleton, Unraveling the “Seamless Garment”: Loose Threads in Pro-Life Progressivism, 2 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 294, 297–98 (2005).  The idea that, for women at least, sex should have 
consequences also helps explain resistance to scientific developments such as emergency 
contraception and the vaccine to prevent human papillomavirus.  See generally Michael Specter, 
Political Science: The Bush Administration’s War on the Laboratory, NEW YORKER, Mar. 13, 
2006, at 58. 
 52. Leslie Reagan, Victim or Accomplice?: Crime, Medical Malpractice, and the 
Construction of the Aborting Woman in American Case Law, 1860s–1970, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 311 (2001) (examining conflicting and evolving understandings of the abortion patient). 
 53. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Abortion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774, 1778–79 
(1991) (criticizing punishment of abortion provider, but not the woman, as incoherent and 
symptomatic of a denial of female autonomy). 
 54. In notable counterexamples, Nicaragua and El Salvador ban all abortions and subject 
both the provider and the woman to imprisonment.  See Jack Hitt, Pro-Life Nation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 9, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 40; Marc Lacey, Nicaraguan Legislature Passes Total Ban on 
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at A8; James C. McKinley, Jr., Nicaragua Eliminates Last 
Exception to Strict Anti-Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, at A5.  Further, some laws in 
the United States allow prosecution of the woman.  Cf. Raja Mishra, DA Declines to Seek Murder 
Charges in Abortion Case: Woman Accused of Using Pills to End Pregnancy, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Mar. 29, 2007, at B5. 
 55. See generally Siegel, supra note 37, at 1007–29 (examining Report of the South Dakota 
Task Force to Study Abortion (2005)). 
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dubbed “post-abortion syndrome,” and physical risks to women.56  Not 
surprisingly, then, South Dakota’s recently enacted in-your-face challenge to 
the Supreme Court, a statute that would ban all but life-saving abortions57 and 
that the citizens of the state rejected at the ballot box,58 provides that 
“[n]othing in [this legislation] may be construed to subject the pregnant mother 
upon whom any abortion is performed or attempted to any criminal conviction 
and penalty.”59  The Louisiana ban—poised to spring into effect upon Roe’s 
burial—contains identical language.60  Similarly, the Federal Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 exempts the woman from prosecution for a 
conspiracy or the substantive offense.61 
A law designed principally to achieve fetal protection would seek to 
maximize deterrence of abortion, punishing both the woman and the 
provider.62  By contrast, the exemption of the woman in the South Dakota, 
Louisiana, and federal laws sends a different message.  It indicates legislative 
purposes to deny women’s agency and decision-making competence and, 
through paternalism, to perpetuate gender inequality.  It constructs women as 
objects of state control through others, here abortion providers.63  Although not 
necessary for reaching this conclusion, the gender-based rhetoric underlying 
South Dakota’s anti-abortion exercise provides strong reinforcement.64 
One final source helps make the case that abortion restrictions address the 
behavior of women rather than the protection of fetuses in their own right.  
 
 56. See id. at 1009–14. 
 57. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-17-7–12 (2006). 
 58. See Monica Davey, South Dakotans Reject Sweeping Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2006, at P8.  After the referendum, the legislative session ended with no new abortion legislation 
enacted.  See Megan Myers, S.D. Abortion Debate Leaves Legislature Quietly—For Now, S.D. 
ARGUS LEADER, Mar. 4, 2007, at 8A. 
 59. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-10 (2006). 
 60. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30(H) (2006) (“Nothing in this Section may be 
construed to subject the pregnant mother upon whom any abortion is performed or attempted to 
any criminal conviction and penalty.”).  Mississippi has also enacted an abortion ban designed to 
go into effect once Roe is overruled; it too excepts the woman from liability.  S.B. 2391, § 2(4), 
2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2007) (signed by Gov. Haley Barbour on Mar. 22, 2007). 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(e) (Supp. IV 2004) (“A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is 
performed may not be prosecuted under this section, for a conspiracy to violate this section, or for 
an offense . . . based on a violation of this section.”). 
 62. Of course, I do not advocate any anti-abortion laws, much less laws like those in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador that prescribe prison terms for women and abortion providers alike.  
See supra note 54; infra text accompanying notes 170–71; cf., e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 
450 U.S. 464, 493–94 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that a gender-neutral law 
prohibiting statutory rape would deter more effectively than a law punishing the male participant 
but not the underage female “victim”). 
 63. This inference does not purport to rest on a discovery of legislative motive.  See infra 
notes 93–95. 
 64. See Siegel, supra note 37. 
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Professor Kristen Luker’s empirical study of the deep division of public 
opinion on whether the law should permit abortion found that, at bottom, the 
opposing camps regard the issue as “a referendum on the place and meaning of 
motherhood.”65  In particular, “pro-life activists believe that motherhood—the 
raising of children and families—is the most fulfilling role that women can 
have.”66  Luker found, moreover, that pro-life activists, like their pro-choice 
counterparts, have fought so fiercely for their views to become law because 
“should ‘the other side’ win, [they] will see the very real devaluation of their 
lives and life resources . . . .”67  Historian Linda Gordon reaches a similar 
conclusion, attributing the strength of the anti-abortion movement to an 
understanding of abortion freedom as “a multidimensional attack on the 
‘traditional’ family and gender system,”68 including traditional norms 
governing sexuality, child-rearing, and employment.69 
In sum, a wide array of evidence—scholarly analyses, case law, statutes, 
and empirical data—supports the thesis that abortion bans embody policies and 
purposes directed at the behavior and roles of women.  To the extent that fetal 
protection is invoked, it simply allows the gender regulation to remain 
unacknowledged, as Professor Siegel explains.70  Put differently, a state cannot 
seek to protect fetuses without first making a value judgment about women71 
or exhibiting a “disparate regard”72 for women, as compared to men.  And 
occasionally the gender-based rationale becomes more explicit, as in the 
materials used by the South Dakota legislature.73  Under either approach, the 
practical problems entailed by making the place of conception an element of 
 
 65. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 193 (1984) (emphasis 
removed).  Luker collected her data by reviewing literature published by organizations taking 
positions on the abortion-rights debate, interviews with 212 activists on both sides of this debate, 
and observations at meetings of groups active on both sides.  Id. at 247–56. 
 66. Id. at 160. 
 67. Id. at 215. 
 68. LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 304 (2002). 
 69. Id. at 304–05. 
 70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 71. At the very least, a state decision to protect fetuses reflects a policy choice to devalue 
women.  See Olsen, supra note 31, at 126. 
 72. Professor Margo Schlanger proposed this term, to express Professor David Strauss’s 
suggestion, in writing about laws with a racially disparate impact, that we “reverse the groups” 
and ask: 
[S]uppose the adverse effects of the challenged government decision fell on whites 
instead of blacks, or on men instead of women.  Would the decision have been different?  
If the answer is yes, then the decision was made with discriminatory intent. 
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 957 
(1989); see Note, Underenfranchisement: Black Voters and the Presidential Nomination Process, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2318, 2338 & n.104 (2004). 
 73. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
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the crime of extraterritorial abortion fade in importance, because the place of 
conception becomes irrelevant—as a matter of theory—to a state’s woman-
focused policy. 
C. Criminal Abortion as a Choice-of-Law Problem 
Despite our intuitive resistance to the notion that a state can stretch its 
criminal prohibitions beyond its borders to reach conduct that is lawful where 
performed, legal authority does not conclusively bear out the underlying 
intuitions.  My students in Conflict of Laws voice this resistance when 
confronting hypotheticals about extraterritorial criminal laws, well after they 
have accepted (with enthusiasm) the insights of modern policy-based 
approaches to choice of law.74  And I confess that I shared this resistance until 
researching this issue many years ago in the context of a different 
contretemps—the question how a state seeking to restrict surrogacy 
arrangements in the wake of the notorious In re Baby M75 might effectuate this 
project.76  I shall not restate here the analysis that leads Professor Fallon to 
identify this as an exceedingly hard, but open, question that the Supreme Court 
might well need to address after Roe’s demise.  Rather, I express my 
agreement with his assessment, offering a few prefatory highlights to introduce 
the particular nuances that I want to examine. 
First, despite the old slogan that “the courts of no country execute the 
penal laws of another”77 and the resulting penal-law exception in the traditional 
choice-of-law regime,78 the rule does not capture the situation hypothesized by 
Professor Fallon.  A permissive state would not be executing the criminal law 
of a restrictive state;79 instead, the restrictive state would apply its own law to 
conduct in the permissive state.  Nonetheless, the slogan and the related 
exception might help explain why criminal law has customarily remained 
immune from scrutiny through a choice-of-law lens. 
 
 74. See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 75. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 76. See Appleton, supra note 17, at 444–52.  For a contemporary case in which a multistate 
surrogacy arrangement was designed to trigger the application of favorable law, see Hodas v. 
Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004). 
 77. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). 
 78. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT 
ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS 79–80 (7th ed. 2006). 
 79. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2005: Nineteenth 
Annual Survey, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 559, 577 (2005) (“[T]he principle means only that the forum 
does not directly apply (‘execute’) foreign penal laws or enforce foreign penal judgments; the 
forum may choose to rely, for its own purposes, on foreign penal laws or judgments.”).  Thus, 
permissive states might choose to respect the laws of restrictive states.  See infra notes 141–44 
and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts’ approach to nondomiciliaries’ attempt to 
celebrate same-sex marriages there). 
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Second, the territorial mindset from which this slogan first emerged no 
longer prevails in conflict of laws.  Across many substantive areas—from torts 
to contracts and beyond—approaches based on Professor Brainerd Currie’s 
governmental interest analysis80 inform the way many courts choose the 
applicable law in modern multi-jurisdictional cases.81  True, courts have not 
explicitly undertaken such analysis in criminal cases, but that simply might 
demonstrate that lawmakers remain “stuck” in the same territorial intuitions 
that make Professor Fallon’s hypothetical seem so unthinkable at first blush.  
Yet, even the Model Penal Code’s section on jurisdiction acknowledges the 
authority of a state to reach conduct elsewhere when 
the offense is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct 
outside the State, when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate 
interest of this State and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is 
likely to affect that interest.82 
Third, the application of United States statutes to offenses committed 
abroad challenges a purely territorial understanding of criminal law.83  Of 
course, one can find several distinctions between such cases and the scenario 
proposed by Professor Fallon.  For example, overarching federal principles, 
such as the full faith and credit obligation84 and the right to travel,85 which 
organize the relations among states, do not apply in the international context.  
In addition, in contrast to the restrictive and permissive regimes hypothesized 
by Professor Fallon, in the international context many broad bases of 
legislative jurisdiction assume that the conduct is barred both in the United 
States and in the country where it takes place.86 
In any event, these introductory observations should, at least, unsettle any 
certainty that territorial sovereignty necessarily and inevitably limits a state’s 
criminal authority.  They also pave the way for the sorts of departures from 
 
 80. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in 
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177 (1963); see also Herma 
Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie’s Governmental Interest Analysis, RECUEIL DES COURS, Vol. 
215(III), at 9. 
 81. For a recent tabulation of the choice-of-law approaches used throughout the American 
states, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2004: Eighteenth 
Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 919, 944 (2004). 
 82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f) (1962). 
 83. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); United States v. 
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), aff’d, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987). 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); see 
infra notes 103–13 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); see infra notes 125–43 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 900–01 (discussing Universal principle). 
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territoriality, common to modern choice-of-law approaches, that inform 
Professor Fallon’s analysis. 
In place of territorial boundaries, modern choice-of-law approaches 
emphasize the policies of the jurisdictions involved in each case.  As Professor 
Brainerd Currie initially formulated governmental interest analysis, beyond a 
presumption that the forum would apply its own law absent a reason to 
displace it, the critical question is whether a state’s policies would be advanced 
by the application of its law to the facts of the case.87  When more than one 
state’s policies can be advanced and no more moderate and restrained 
interpretation will eliminate the resulting “true conflict,” then the forum should 
apply its own law.88  Of course, today none of the states strictly follows 
interest analysis as Professor Currie outlined it.89  Nonetheless, Professor 
Currie’s intellectual legacy shines through in popular methodologies like that 
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws’s “most-significant-
relationship” test,90 which instructs courts to consider “the relevant policies of 
the forum”91 and “the relevant policies of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue.”92 
As I explained earlier, abortion restrictions seek to control the conduct of 
women.93  A state enacting a criminal ban does so for policy reasons 
 
 87. See Currie, supra note 80, at 183–84; see also Kay, supra note 80, at 50–58, 105–06, 
110, 123, 127 (explaining how Professor Currie distinguished policies and interests); id. at 75 
(noting that Professor Currie later eliminated the first step, which specified that forum law 
provides the presumptive starting point). 
 88. Currie, supra note 80, at 184. 
 89. Professor Symeonides lists California, the District of Columbia, and New Jersey as 
jurisdictions that use interest analysis for torts, although not for contracts.  Symeonides, supra 
note 81, at 944.  But even courts in these states have strayed from strict adherence to Professor 
Currie’s methodology.  See, e.g., Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914 (Cal. 
2006) (illustrating how California has engrafted the “comparative impairment” approach onto 
interest analysis); Jaffe v. Pallotta TeamWorks, 374 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating 
that the District of Columbia “follows the ‘substantial interest’ position of the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) § 145, under which the court will balance the competing 
interests of the two jurisdictions, and apply the law of the jurisdiction with the more ‘substantial 
interest’ in the resolution of the issue” (quoting Lamphier v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 524 A.2d 729, 731 
(D.C. 1987))); Warriner v. Stanton, No. 03-2211, 2005 WL 1397015 (D.N.J. June 14, 2005) 
(invoking New Jersey’s governmental interest analysis but balancing interests to choose 
Delaware’s statute of limitations because of “the extensive connections of Delaware to all parties 
in this case, and the paramount interest of Delaware in regulating the medical care offered within 
its borders”); cf. Currie, supra note 80, at 181–82 (rejecting judicial “weighing” of competing 
interests). 
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).  According to Professor 
Symeonides, twenty-two American jurisdictions use this approach for torts cases and twenty-four 
do so for contracts cases.  Symeonides, supra note 81, at 944. 
 91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b). 
 92. Id. § 6(2)(c). 
 93. See supra notes 25–73 and accompanying text. 
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inescapably related to women.  This conclusion does not purport to rest upon a 
discovery of legislative motive.  Indeed, the clues that I examined before94 do 
not necessarily disclose legislative motives either individually or collectively.  
Rather, these clues help us use the ordinary processes of construction and 
interpretation that Professor Currie commended.95 
If we assume, at least provisionally, that the state has its own women in 
mind, as Professor Currie theorized96 and the Restatement (Second) assumes,97 
then the restrictive state has a policy at stake whenever a female domiciliary 
seeks to terminate a pregnancy, regardless of the place of conception and 
regardless of place of the abortion.  Now, I do not mean to suggest that a 
restrictive state would so exclusively focus on its own domiciliaries and so 
wholeheartedly abandon territoriality that it would willingly permit abortions 
within its borders so long as the women came from other states—and I shall 
consider this point more later.98  For now, however, I simply note that, if a 
restrictive state is going to attempt to address the travel “loophole,” as 
Professor Fallon hypothesizes, this state would do so without regard to the 
place where the local woman conceived. 
Professor Fallon indicated informally that he thought that place of 
conception might prove important in determining whether the restrictive state 
has a sufficient interest to apply its own law to the out-of-state abortion.99  If 
he simply meant that the only policy underlying the state’s law is fetal 
protection, I have already indicated my disagreement.100  Indeed, the 
invisibility of gender regulation in Professor Fallon’s thought experiment 
continues a long tradition in choice of law, in which noteworthy cases and 
commentary often analyzed rules enacted at women’s expense without 
questioning the merits.101  If, on the other hand, Professor Fallon meant to 
 
 94. See id. 
 95. See Currie, supra note 80, at 182–83; see also Kay, supra note 80, at 51–52 (noting how 
Professor Currie recognized that sometimes a legislature will conceal the underlying purpose). 
 96. Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in 
CURRIE, supra note 80, at 77, 85–86. 
 97. Several sections of the Restatement (Second) recognize the parties’ domiciles as contacts 
to be considered in determining the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971). 
 98. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 99. Conversation with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional 
Law, Harvard Law School, in St. Louis, Mo. (Oct. 13, 2006). 
 100. See supra notes 25–73 and accompanying text. 
 101. E.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878) (concerning contractual incapacity of 
married women); Univ. of Chi. v. Dater, 270 N.W. 175 (Mich. 1936) (concerning contractual 
incapacity of married women); Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1936) (concerning 
interspousal tort immunity); Erwin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973) (concerning loss of 
consortium actions not available to wives, but available to husbands); Haumschild v. Cont’l Cas. 
Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959) (concerning interspousal tort immunity); see also Saenz v. Roe, 
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anticipate possible arguments that, without a locally conceived fetus, the 
restrictive state would lack a sufficient interest to satisfy the constitutional tests 
for applying its law, then a more fine-grained analysis becomes necessary. 
The woman’s domicile alone would easily satisfy the very loose outer 
limits imposed by the Due Process102 and Full Faith and Credit103 Clauses on a 
restrictive state’s application of its own law to the true conflict presented by an 
abortion performed on one of its domiciliaries in a permissive state.104  These 
outer limits require only “that for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a 
constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact 
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice 
of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”105  The woman’s 
domicile is a significant contact, and it creates an interest on the part of the 
restrictive state, as I have shown. 
In fact, even if I were to agree with Professor Fallon that the restrictive 
state’s policy seeks to protect fetuses, rather than to control women, the fetuses 
presumably within this sphere of concern would be those conceived 
(anywhere) by local women.  This is so because, as noted earlier, an infant 
takes the domicile of the parent by operation of law, wherever the infant might 
have been born or has lived.106  A restrictive state that treats an embryo or fetus 
as an “unborn infant” would apply this rule accordingly.  Hence, the pregnant 
woman’s domicile does all the necessary work; it becomes the critical element 
regardless whether the state’s policy is woman-focused or fetus-focused. 
This domiciliary contact and the resulting interest go a long way toward 
foreclosing possible assertions of arbitrariness or unfairness.  The approach 
evident in American cases using extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction in the 
 
526 U.S. 489 (1999) (discussed infra notes 128–40 and accompanying text).  Professor Currie 
used Milliken v. Pratt and married women’s contractual incapacity in his pathbreaking essay 
introducing interest analysis.  Currie, supra note 96. 
 102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”). 
 104. The constitutional test is not very demanding, as applied to recognition of another state’s 
law.  See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003).  The hypothesized case 
embodies a true conflict because the woman’s domicile has an anti-abortion policy aimed at her 
but the abortion takes place in a state that has made a policy choice in favor of abortion freedom.  
This latter policy might rest on the permissive state’s views about physicians’ professional 
obligations, their freedom of conscience, or even the commercial value of traveling patients.  To 
the extent that the permissive state’s policy reflects exclusively a preference for women’s 
autonomy and gender equality, however, such policy would not create a true conflict, under 
Professor Currie’s typical analysis, because the case does not concern a woman domiciled in the 
permissive state.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 105. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion)). 
 106. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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international criminal context provides a reinforcing response to concerns 
about arbitrariness or unfairness.107  Finally, any remaining gap would be filled 
by a law drafted in accord with the Model Penal Code’s section on prohibitions 
of conduct outside the state, which requires “a reasonable relation to a 
legitimate [state] interest” and the actor’s culpability with respect to that 
interest.108 
So far, I have assumed that an abortion-banning state’s focus on women 
would target pregnant women domiciled in that state.  Certainly, this sort of 
assumption provided Professor Currie’s point of departure in his formulation 
of interest analysis109—a point of departure that, in turn, has evoked charges of 
unconstitutionality under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.110  With 
abortion bans, however, a different issue might well arise.  Often anti-abortion 
views reflect such deep ideological convictions that a legislator supporting a 
ban might well offer an expansive answer to Professor Currie’s question about 
an enacting state’s sphere of concern, with claims that the goal is—insofar as 
possible—to halt all abortions sought by all women everywhere.  Indeed, Dean 
John Hart Ely thought this general situation, a state policy not limited to its 
domiciliaries, would probably often arise.111 
In this context, then, the very loose limits of the Due Process and Full 
Faith and Credit Clauses on choice of law would have some meaningful work 
to do, preventing such a capacious policy goal from application in cases with 
which the enacting state has no contact and in which it has no interest.112  
Thus, the restrictive state could apply its law to abortions performed on its own 
domiciliaries, wherever they might travel to terminate their pregnancies, and 
also to anyone performing an abortion within the restrictive state, regardless of 
 
 107. True, some of the bases of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction in the international 
context contemplate conduct that is prohibited everywhere.  See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. 
Supp. 896, 900–02 (D.D.C. 1988); supra note 86 and accompanying text.  But the case law 
contains ample evidence that this limitation does not inevitably apply.  See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 
902 n.10.  Further, the Restatement’s balancing test presumably would incorporate the 
permissibility of the conduct where performed as a factor to be weighed against other 
considerations.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 402–03 (1987). 
 108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 101(1)(f) (1962). 
 109. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); see, e.g., John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and 
the State’s Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); Douglas 
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of 
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992). 
 111. Ely, supra note 110, at 193–94. 
 112. See, e.g., Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985); see also supra notes 
102–05 and accompanying text. 
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the patient’s domicile.113  Both situations satisfy the minimal constitutional 
requirements.  Abortions performed elsewhere involving no domiciliaries, 
however, would lie beyond the restrictive state’s reach, no matter how 
expansive or deeply ideological its anti-abortion policy. 
In sum, although the conclusion is not free from controversy—as the 
scholarly literature114 reveals and as Professor Fallon’s own Article 
demonstrates—I find in the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses no 
insurmountable obstacles to a restrictive state’s law banning abortions 
performed elsewhere on its traveling domiciliaries. 
Nonetheless, difficulties under other constitutional constraints—
specifically the Commerce Clause115 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause116—loom larger.  As Professor Mark Rosen’s 
earlier examination of such issues concludes, “extraterritorial powers are not 
precluded by the Dormant Commerce Clause, so long as the regulations are not 
species of economic protectionism and are directed primarily to the state’s own 
citizens.”117  He reaches this conclusion in part because “[a]ll the Dormant 
Commerce Clause cases have struck down statutes in which the extraterritorial 
regulations applied primarily to noncitizens of the regulating State.”118  
Professor Fallon follows suit, using as his starting point the punishment of the 
traveling woman, while observing that “it is not obvious that [the restrictive 
state] should be able to apply its law to one party to the transaction but not to 
the other . . . .”119  In any event, Professor Fallon’s analysis makes clear that he 
envisions the conduct of the traveling woman to constitute the principal 
offense, with the liability of the abortion provider only a secondary matter 
based on his or her role as an accomplice.120 
 
 113. Of course, the latter situation—applying the restrictive state’s ban to all abortions 
performed within the state—presents our usual understanding of criminal laws that apply to 
conduct within the enacting state’s boundaries.  Further, I agree with Professor Mark Rosen that a 
state may rely on domicile as the connecting factor in some cases and the place of conduct in 
others, without creating constitutional problems.  Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political 
Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 934–41 (2002). 
 114. Compare id., with Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right 
to Life, and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873 (1993), and Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of 
Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in 
American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992) [hereinafter Kreimer, The Law of Choice 
and Choice of Law], and Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in 
American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973 (2002). 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .”). 
 116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”). 
 117. Rosen, supra note 113, at 964 (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. at 926 (emphasis added). 
 119. Fallon, supra note 1, at 633. 
 120. Id. 
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Two difficulties emerge from this position.  First, as I explained earlier, 
most American abortion prohibitions do not work this way.121  Even recently 
enacted laws—the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 and new 
legislation passed in South Dakota and Louisiana in 2006—all would punish 
the abortion provider while explicitly exempting the woman from all 
liability.122  Hence, for a state to take the bold action of extending its ban to 
out-of-state abortions without offending the Commerce Clause would require 
an even more paradigm-shifting move, enacting a law directing prosecution 
and punishment of the abortion patient.  The political viability of this move 
remains in doubt,123 especially given modern anti-abortion strategies that 
emphasize the protection of women.124 
Second, as Professor Fallon recognizes, a law punishing the woman would 
raise serious issues about the right to travel and would require deciding 
whether the rights of national citizenship trump the obligations of state 
citizenship.125  As a result, then, the right of national citizenship would acquire 
a diminished meaning for women, compared to men.126  As I suggested earlier, 
Professor Fallon’s emphasis on the place of conception might impose on 
women the extra burden of leaving restrictive states to engage in sexual 
relations;127 here, by contrast, the law would frustrate women’s ability to travel 
for certain purposes, as he explains. 
In my view, however, Professor Fallon’s acknowledgment of the difficulty 
fails to go quite far enough.  I would add some analysis of the Court’s 
admittedly unusual decision in Saenz v. Roe,128 which successfully challenged 
a California residency requirement for California-level welfare benefits. 
Several facets of Saenz prove instructive.  Saenz’s facts, including the 
identity of the three plaintiffs, all women fleeing domestic violence in their 
previous home states,129 remind us that even facially neutral laws can have 
particularly harsh effects for some individuals, usually those from groups 
already marginalized and vulnerable.  Thus, in addition to the lens of gender, 
through which we might readily view abortion restrictions, we must also 
consider class and race.  Indeed, data show that the current abortion population 
 
 121. See supra notes 52–64 and accompanying text. 
 122. See id.  The South Dakota law was overturned by a voters’ referendum, and the 
legislature has not yet passed a revised statute.  See supra note 58. 
 123. See Samuel W. Buell, Op-Ed., Abortion Law’s Criminal Loophole: Who Would Go to 
Jail in South Dakota? Not Women, and It’s All Because of Politics, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at 
B17. 
 124. See Siegel, supra note 37; supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 125. Fallon, supra note 1, at 632–34, 638–40. 
 126. See id. at 647–48. 
 127. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 128. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 129. See id. at 494 (“Each plaintiff alleged that she had recently moved to California to live 
with relatives in order to escape abusive family circumstances.”) 
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disproportionately consists of poor women and African American and Hispanic 
women.130  As a result, all post-Roe restrictions will have a corresponding 
disproportionate impact. 
Doctrinally, Saenz is important too because it rescued from oblivion the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.131  This Clause, 
which the Court almost never uses, crystallizes the tension inherent in 
Americans’ dual citizenship, because it provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .132 
Although the Court emphasized the right to travel from one state to another 
as a privilege of national citizenship, its taxonomy of the components of this 
right does not unequivocally address the precise situation presented by out-of-
state abortion.  More specifically, a restrictive state’s punishment of out-of-
state abortion does not necessarily implicate any of the following guarantees 
articulated in Saenz: 
the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right 
to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien temporarily 
present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become 
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.133 
As Professor Fallon notes, cases establishing the first of these 
components134 might or might not be interpreted to preclude a restrictive 
state’s effort to ban out-of-state abortions by its citizens.135  And just as Roe’s 
companion case, Doe v. Bolton,136 recognized the second of these components 
 
 130. According to the Guttmacher Institute, 
[t]he abortion rate among women living below the federal povery level ($9,570 for a 
single woman with no children) is more than four times that of women above 300% of the 
poverty level (44 vs. 10 abortions per 1,000 women). 
Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), 
June 2006, at 1, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf.  Further, 
“Black women are almost four times as likely as white women to have an abortion, and Hispanic 
women are 2.5 times as likely.”  Id. 
 131. As Chief Justice Rehnquist recounted in his Saenz dissent, 
The Court today breathes new life into the previously dormant Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—a Clause relied upon by this Court in only one 
other decision, Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935), overruled five 
years later by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 60 S. Ct. 406 (1940). 
Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 132. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (emphasis added). 
 133. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500. 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
 135. Fallon, supra note 1, at 638–39. 
 136. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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in invoking the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV to invalidate 
Georgia’s residency requirement for abortions,137 Professor Fallon accurately 
describes the usual application of this Clause to discrimination practiced 
against nondomiciliaries, rather than to efforts by a state to ensure that its own 
domiciliaries are everywhere governed by its own laws.138  He concludes that 
the constitutionality of his hypothetical law thus remains debatable.139  Finally, 
Saenz’s list claims not to be exclusive; it says that the “right to travel” 
recognized in case law “embraces at least three different components,”140 thus 
leaving room for the subsequent recognition of other components of the right. 
One variation that Professor Fallon does not consider is suggested by 
Massachusetts’ current treatment of same-sex marriage by nondomiciliaries.  
Following the state’s own “marriage evasion law,”141 Massachusetts officials 
may marry same-sex couples with a domiciliary connection to Massachusetts 
or to any other state that does not have a prohibition against same-sex 
marriage.  Travelers from states with prohibitions against same-sex marriages, 
however, may not celebrate such marriages in Massachusetts.142 
Although the federal Defense of Marriage Act143 adds an element to this 
analysis that the abortion hypothetical does not include, the Massachusetts 
approach shows how permissive states might well try to help restrictive states 
enforce their abortion prohibitions extraterritorially.  For example, permissive 
states might regulate their own abortion providers so that they may accept 
patients only from states without abortion prohibitions.  With such gestures of 
interstate respect, a restrictive state’s criminal prohibition, even if applied 
directly only to local abortions, would accomplish wider goals. 
Yet, while perhaps less controversial than a ban on out-of-state abortions, 
the Massachusetts approach would probably not altogether avoid the complex, 
difficult, and rarely explored questions about the resulting clash between the 
traveling woman’s right to equal treatment under Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and the elusive mandate of interstate respect under the 
Article IV’s Full Faith and Credit Clause.144  Accordingly, whether embodied 
 
 137. Id. at 200. 
 138. Fallon, supra note 1, at 635. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 11–13 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
 142. Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006).  After remand, the 
Superior Court determined that same-sex marriage is not prohibited in Rhode Island, so that 
Rhode Island domiciliaries may celebrate such marriages in Massachusetts, in contrast to 
domiciliaries of New York, which prohibits such marriages.  Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, No. 04-2656, 2006 WL 3208758 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2006). 
 143. 28 U.S.C. §1738C (2000); see also 1 U.S.C. §7 (2000). 
 144. The Massachusetts approach resembles a solution offered by Professor Currie and co-
author Professor Herma Hill Kay (then Herma Hill Schreter, one of Professor Currie’s students).  
Brainerd Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: 
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in a criminal prohibition designed to reach out-of-state abortions or in one 
confined to local cases but respected in other states, a rule making access to 
abortion dependent solely on one’s domicile raises the stakes of both national 
and state citizenship; the resulting face-off between these two constitutional 
principles would become especially intense, suffused as it necessarily would be 
with differing value judgments about gender norms, maternal health, local 
physicians’ professional obligations, freedom of conscience, and other 
similarly contentious matters. 
All of these uncertainties and contested claims accumulate to add force to 
Professor Fallon’s central argument about the third fallacy as well as the other 
three: After Roe’s end the Court will confront new constitutional problems 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, Article 
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, and Article IV’s Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, among others.  And these problems promise to prove no less vexing 
than the difficult questions raised in Roe and later abortion cases. 
II.  LESS CONTROVERSIAL, EQUALLY CHILLING: TORT LIABILITY AND 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
But wait.  The conceit animating the third fallacy is an extraterritorial 
criminal prohibition—a law sufficiently unfamiliar that it strains, without 
clearly contravening, both conventional choice-of-law analysis and established 
constitutional interpretations.  If a restrictive state could prevent out-of-state 
terminations of its domiciliaries’ pregnancies without resorting to criminal law, 
then some of the difficulties examined earlier might dissipate.  Here, two 
alternatives merit consideration. 
 
Privileges and Immunities, in CURRIE, supra note 80, at 445.  They propose, in some cases, 
applying forum law to nondomiciliaries whose homes states have similar laws.  See id. at 504–07; 
see also Kay, supra note 80, at 62–63, 145–46; cf. id. at 172–75 (developing the concept of 
toleration of another state’s law). 
  Dean John Hart Ely rejected this approach as inconsistent with the Court’s cases on 
Article IV.  Ely, supra note 110, at 185–86.  Further, Saenz suggests additional doubts about this 
approach.  There, the Court invalidated California’s law that would have given new arrivals in 
California the same welfare benefits they would have received in the states they had left, with 
benefits at California’s level available only after one year’s wait.  Saenz, 526 U.S. at 510–11.  
Thus, the unconstitutional California law treated former (not present) out-of staters as they would 
have been treated at their previous homes, creating a distinction between two classes of California 
domiciliaries.  Id.  Some past cases evaluated such distinctions between long-term domiciliaries 
and new domiciliaries under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
  The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is the second component of the right 
to travel explicated in Saenz.  See supra note 133 and accompanying text.  For some of the sparse 
commentary on the relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, see Currie & Schreter, supra; Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of 
Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1988). 
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Tort liability, a staple of choice-of-law cases over the years, offers one 
path—as developments even before the end of Roe demonstrate.  For example, 
Okpalobi v. Foster145 examined a Louisiana statute that the court described as 
follows: 
 Act 825 provides to women who undergo an abortion a private tort remedy 
against the doctors who perform the abortion.  It exposes those doctors to 
unlimited tort liability for any damages caused by the abortion procedure to 
both mother and “unborn child.”  Damages may be reduced, but not eliminated 
altogether (and perhaps not at all with respect to any damages asserted on 
behalf of the fetus), if the pregnant woman signs a consent form prior to the 
abortion procedure.146 
It takes little imagination to see that laws giving specific individuals a 
cause of action for damages against abortion providers chill the practice of 
abortion.147  The district court in Okpalobi determined that the Louisiana 
statute had the purpose and effect of chilling the exercise of constitutionally 
protected rights and placed an unconstitutional undue burden on a woman’s 
right to abortion.148  A risk-averse abortion provider would need to anticipate 
all possible reasons an abortion patient might choose to sue later, including the 
possibility of subsequent emotional difficulties,149 and then detail all of these 
possibilities in the pre-abortion consent form, presenting a “parade of 
horribles”150—if the provider continued to practice at all under these onerous 
circumstances, given that a suit for “reduced” damages could nevertheless 
follow.  (Imagine, among other problems, the increased difficulties and costs 
of obtaining professional insurance!) 
 
 145. 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 146. Id. at 409. 
 147. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional Accountability, 79 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 753 (2006); A.J. Stone, III, Consti-tortion: Tort Law as an End Run Around 
Abortion Rights After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471 
(2000). 
 148. Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 986 (E.D. La. 1998), rev’d en banc, 244 F.3d 405 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
 149. Abortion opponents often assert that patients suffer a host of post-abortion harms, 
including emotional distress.  See, e.g., Angela Langranchi, The Abortion-Breast Cancer Link: 
The Studies and the Science, in THE COST OF “CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF 
ABORTION 72 (Erika Bachiochi ed., 2004) [hereinafter THE COST OF “CHOICE”]; Elizabeth M. 
Shadigian, Reviewing the Evidence, Breaking the Silence: Long-Term Physical and Psychological 
Health Consequences of Induced Abortion, in THE COST OF “CHOICE”, supra, at 63.  The South 
Dakota legislature considered such claims before enacting a ban on abortions.  See Siegel, supra 
note 37; see also Emily Bazelon, Is There a Post-Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 
2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 40. 
 150. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983), overruled 
by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883 (1992). 
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Ultimately, however, the Okpalobi challenge was dismissed by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, because—in 
effect—such “self-enforcing state legislation that infringes on constitutional 
rights”151 escapes federal court review, under Article III’s case-or-controversy 
requirement152 and the Eleventh Amendment’s immunity for state officials.153  
Yet, the hypothesized overruling of Roe takes the wind out of the primary 
criticism of Okapalobi—the federal courts’ asserted inability to stop state 
legislation enacted with the purpose and effect of eliminating abortion, in spite 
of its constitutionally protected status.  After Roe’s end, this particular problem 
will no longer exist. 
Another illustration of a civil cause of action for damages appears in the 
federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which includes the following 
language: 
(c)(1) The father, if married to the mother at the time she receives a partial-
birth abortion procedure, and if the mother has not attained the age of 18 years 
at the time of the abortion, the maternal grandparents of the fetus, may in a 
civil action obtain appropriate relief, unless the pregnancy resulted from the 
plaintiff’s criminal conduct or the plaintiff consented to the abortion. 
(2) Such relief shall include—(A) money damages for all injuries, 
psychological and physical, occasioned by the violation of this section; and (B) 
statutory damages equal to three times the cost of the partial-birth abortion.154 
Certainly after Roe’s end, if not before, a restrictive state might enact 
legislation along the lines of these examples, and a court in a restrictive state 
should have no problem in applying this law in a suit brought there seeking to 
recover damages for an abortion performed on a domiciliary who has traveled 
to a permissive state.  Assuming it could obtain personal jurisdiction over the 
abortion provider,155 a court in the restrictive state could apply its own law to 
this true conflict.156  Such tort litigation, so commonplace in the conflict of 
 
 151. Borgmann, supra note 147, at 757. 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2. 
 153. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States . . . .”). 
 154. 18 U.S.C. §1531(c) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 155. Even if the provider failed to satisfy the constitutional requirement of purposeful 
availment of the benefits of the forum, here the restrictive state, he might be personally served 
while present in the state.  Compare Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 93–94 (1978) (articulating 
and interpreting requirement of purposeful availment), with Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 
619 (1990) (constitutionally validating principle of personal jurisdiction based on personal 
service while present). 
 156. See supra notes 87–97 and accompanying text; cf. Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 
(2d Cir. 1973) (applying New York law on damages to a medical malpractice case brought in 
New York seeking recovery for a New York patient’s death against a Massachusetts physician 
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laws, would avoid both the novelty and its choice-of-law consequences 
presented by Professor Fallon’s hypothesized extraterritorial criminal ban.  
Much more significantly, however, even before a lawsuit is filed, the 
availability of the civil remedy would effectively deter the provision of 
abortion services elsewhere to domiciliaries of the restrictive state.  A risk-
averse abortion provider in a permissive state must turn away patients from 
any state with such legislation or else avoid all travel there, where service of 
process during transient presence would confer jurisdiction over the tort suit.157 
A Missouri statute now before the state supreme court exemplifies the 
effectiveness of such civil remedies in targeting abortions to be performed 
across state lines.  The statute, enacted to halt the practice of abortions on 
Missouri minors in Illinois, which unlike Missouri has no parental involvement 
requirement,158 provides a civil remedy for parents against anyone who 
intentionally causes, aids, or assists a minor in obtaining an abortion without 
complying with Missouri’s parental consent requirement or the alternative of a 
judicial bypass.159  A trial court upheld the law against constitutional 
 
who performed surgery in Massachusetts), abrogated by Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civ. 
Aviation of The People’s Repub. of China, 923 F.2d 957, 963 (2d Cir. 1991).  But see Warriner v. 
Stanton, No. 03-2211, 2005 WL 1397015 (D.N.J. June 14, 2005) (invoking New Jersey’s 
governmental interest analysis but applying Delaware’s statute of limitations to a malpractice 
action brought by a New Jersey domiciliary against a Delaware physician for treatment provided 
in Delaware). 
 157. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619. 
 158. A parental notification requirement and waiting period enacted in Illinois in 1995, never 
enforced because of judicial obstacles, may become operative soon.  See Kevin McDermott, State 
Court’s Action Revives Illinois Abortion Law, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 2006, at B3. 
 159. The statute provides: 
Causing, aiding, or assisting a minor to obtain an abortion prohibited, civil penalty—
impermissible defenses—court injunction authorized, when.— 
1. No person shall intentionally cause, aid, or assist a minor to obtain an abortion without 
the consent or consents required by section 188.028. 
2. A person who violates subsection 1 of this section shall be civilly liable to the minor 
and to the person or persons required to give the consent or consents under section 
188.028.  A court may award damages to the person or persons adversely affected by a 
violation of subsection 1 of this section, including compensation for emotional injury 
without the need for personal presence at the act or event, and the court may further award 
attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and punitive damages. Any adult who engages in or 
consents to another person engaging in a sex act with a minor in violation of the 
provisions of chapter 566, 567, 568, or 573, RSMo, which results in the minor’s 
pregnancy shall not be awarded damages under this section. 
3. It shall not be a defense to a claim brought under this section that the abortion was 
performed or induced pursuant to consent to the abortion given in a manner that is 
otherwise lawful in the state or place where the abortion was performed or induced. 
4. An unemancipated minor does not have capacity to consent to any action in violation of 
this section or section 188.028. 
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challenge, while identifying particular constructions that could create a 
violation of the First Amendment’s protection of speech.160  The oral 
arguments in the Missouri Supreme Court also emphasized the implications for 
abortion counseling of the law’s uncertain sweep.161  In the meantime, the law 
has already had the undoubtedly desired chilling effect, with Illinois abortion 
clinics now requiring Missouri minors to comply with Missouri’s requirements 
before obtaining abortions there162 and Missouri organizations, such as 
Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, deciding that the law makes too 
risky continuing to provide any information at all about Illinois abortions or 
the absence of a parental-involvement requirement there.163 
This Missouri statute also suggests a second path that would avoid the 
complexities engendered by extraterritorial criminal bans.  It permits a court to 
enjoin conduct that would contravene the statute.164  Pursuant to this model, 
courts in restrictive states might enjoin local women from obtaining an 
abortion in a permissive state.  Although under the Roe regime such suits for 
injunctive relief typically failed,165 the removal of constitutional protection for 
 
5. A court may enjoin conduct that would be in violation of this section upon petition by 
the attorney general, a prosecuting or circuit attorney, or any person adversely affected or 
who reasonably may be adversely affected by such conduct, upon a showing that such 
conduct: 
(1) Is reasonably anticipated to occur in the future; or 
(2) Has occurred in the past, whether with the same minor or others, and that it is not 
unreasonable to expect that such conduct will be repeated. 
MO. REV. STAT. §188.250 (Supp. 2005). 
 160. Planned Parenthood of Kan. and Mid-Mo., Inc. v. Nixon, No. 0516-CV25949, 2005 WL 
3707407, at *8, *16 (Mo. Cir. Nov. 18, 2005). 
 161. See Matthew Franck, Abortion, Free Speech at Issue in High Court, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 2006, at C1. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Now, each employee or volunteer at Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region follows 
a script when addressing young women under eighteen, stating that “due to a recent law passed in 
Missouri, I am unable to give you information about abortion care in states that do not require 
parental consent[;] you will, unfortunately have to get that information on your own.”  E-mail 
from Paula Gianino, President & CEO, Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, to Susan 
Frelich Appleton, Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law (Nov. 27, 2006, at 
09:17:00 CST) (on file with author).  Likewise, information about abortions in states without 
parental consent laws have been removed from the organization’s website and from links to other 
websites.  Id. 
  A proposed federal law, the so-called “Child Custody Protection Act,” would criminalize 
helping a minor go out of state to evade a parental involvement law.  S. 403, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 164. MO. REV. STAT. §188.028-2(5) (2000). 
 165. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 486 U.S. 1308 (1988); Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1988), aff’d, 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988). 
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abortion would change the reasoning and outcome of such cases.166  And once 
a restrictive state enjoined a particular abortion, then that decree would be 
entitled to Full Faith and Credit elsewhere, including the permissive state, 
provided the parties involved had their day in court and were subject to the 
enjoining court’s jurisdiction.167 
Again, multistate civil cases in which a court grants injunctive relief would 
certainly not make all controversy evaporate.  And, injunctive relief would 
have a narrow scope, most likely applying to one abortion and one woman at a 
time—rather than producing a more far-reaching chill, as the availability of 
tort remedies would.  Nonetheless, injunction cases would present the 
contested issues in a form far more familiar to the conflict of laws than the 
innovative criminal statute hypothesized by Professor Fallon. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Professor Fallon has insisted that his “point is more analytical than 
normative or predictive: If the Supreme Court were to overrule Roe v. Wade, it 
would almost certainly need to confront hard issues about the meaning of both 
state citizenship and national citizenship.”168  And, consistent with this 
disclaimer, I have taken a doctrinal excursion through what Professor Seth 
Kreimer has unforgettably named “the law of choice and choice of law.”169 
Yet, behind Professor Fallon’s analysis and despite the disclaimer, a 
normative message emerges: The Court should not overturn Roe because doing 
so would require the Court to confront excruciatingly challenging 
 
 166. For example, in Conn, the court found “dispositive” Roe and Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), which relied on Roe to invalidate Missouri’s spousal 
consent requirement.  Conn, 525 N.E.2d at 613. 
 167. As the Supreme Court explained in Baker v. General Motors Corp.: 
The Court has never placed equity decrees outside the full faith and credit domain.  Equity 
decrees for the payment of money have long been considered equivalent to judgments at 
law entitled to nationwide recognition.  See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 65 S. Ct. 
137, 89 L.Ed. 82 (1944) (unconditional adjudication of petitioner’s right to recover a sum 
of money is entitled to full faith and credit); see also A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws § 
51, p. 182 (rev. ed. 1962) (describing as “indefensible” the old doctrine that an equity 
decree, because it does not “merge” the claim into the judgment, does not qualify for 
recognition).  We see no reason why the preclusive effects of an adjudication on parties 
and those “in privity” with them, i.e., claim preclusion and issue preclusion (res judicata 
and collateral estoppel), should differ depending solely upon the type of relief sought in a 
civil action.  Cf. Barber, 323 U.S. at 87, 65 S. Ct. at 141–142 (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statute speak not of “judgments” but 
of “‘judicial proceedings’ without limitation”); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2 (providing for “one 
form of action to be known as ‘civil action,’” in lieu of discretely labeled actions at law 
and suits in equity). 
522 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1998). 
 168. Fallon, supra note 1, at 633. 
 169. See Kreimer, The Law of Choice and the Choice of Law, supra note 114. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] GENDER, ABORTION, AND TRAVEL AFTER ROE’S END 683 
constitutional issues.  In one sense, Professor Fallon goes too far with this 
implication.  In my view, some of the difficulties he imagines (at least in the 
third fallacy) rest on the hypothesis that a restrictive state committed to 
deterring out-of-state abortions by its domiciliaries would enact an 
extraterritorial criminal ban.  As I have indicated, however, civil remedies 
might prove equally effective and far less provocative. 
In another sense, however, Professor Fallon does not go far enough.  I 
would stake out a normative position more explicitly, and—as I have explained 
elsewhere—this position would oppose overturning Roe because of the official 
gender hierarchy that this reversal would both signal and endorse.170  And, I 
would emphasize that the doctrinal and theoretical intricacies above, including 
the prospect of a gendered right to travel, should not eclipse the much more 
down-to-earth issues, specifically the very real threats to women’s health and 
well-being—not to mention their family autonomy and equal citizenship and 
the especially harsh impact on poor and minority women. 
Some of the most famous cases and commentary in the evolution of new 
choice-of-law approaches concerned rules that subordinated women and 
denied their agency.171  We should hope that new developments in choice of 
law do not depend on newly imposed forms of gender oppression. 
 
 170. Appleton, supra note 51. 
 171. See supra note 101. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
684 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:655 
 
